The upper income advanced industrial countries of the world today all have market economies with open competition, competitive multi-party democratic political systems, and a secure government monopoly over violence. Such open access orders, however, are not the only norm and equilibrium type of society. The middle and low income developing countries today, like all countries before about 1800, can be understood as limited access orders that maintain their equilibrium in a fundamentally different way. In limited access orders the state does not have a secure monopoly on violence, and society organizes itself to control violence among the elite factions. A common feature of limited access orders is that political elites divide up control of the economy, each getting some share of the rents. Since outbreaks of violence reduce the rents, the elite factions have incentives to be peaceable most of the time. Adequate stability of the rents and thus of the social order requires limiting access and competition-hence a social order with a fundamentally different logic than the open access order. The paper lays out this framework and explores some of its implications for the problems of development today.
I. Introduction
Most development policy today is based on models of the developed world and attempts to make developing countries look more like developed ones. Unfortunately, the social dynamics of developed countries fundamentally differ from those of developing countries. Development practitioners therefore face a mismatch between the development problems they seek to address and the available tools. They aim to implement social, economic, and political institutions characteristic of the developed West in societies that often cannot even secure basic physical order. To improve state capacity they might, for example, administer donor funds conditional on improving government transparency through better financial auditing of public funds. But they do so in countries where potential leadership groups compete for control through violence, intimidation, and occasionally the ballot box, and where new groups replace old groups at regular intervals. Development practitioners face the futility of trying to solve a problem without knowing its cause and to build state capacity in societies that regularly dismember their governments. Development tools based on first world experiences are ill-suited to the development goals in third world countries.
The first step to more effective development policies is a more realistic understanding of how societies actually behave and, in particular, how developing societies different from developed ones. This paper and the research it proposes builds on a new conceptual framework for interpreting recorded human history (RHH), developed by North, Wallis, and Weingast (2006) . By laying out the conceptual framework, we hope to initiate a new conversation within the World Bank and the larger scholarly and policy community about how developing societies structure their economies and polities in order to solve the universal problem of violence and disorder.
The problem of providing powerful individuals with an incentive to be peaceful motivates the entire framework. Systematic consideration of violence, and the role it plays in shaping societies, is fundamental to the problem of economic, political, and social development. All societies possess institutions, organizations, and beliefs that enable them to deal with violence with varying degrees of success. These social structures embody a fundamental logic, captured in the concept of a social order. Standard development advice fails all too frequently because it conflicts with the social logic that maintains order. This paper does not propose any concrete
The framework builds the logic of limited and open access social orders to explain why they differ fundamentally in their organization, behavior, and consequences, including freedom and economic growth. The framework also sheds light on how societies make the transition between the two social orders.
Limited access orders vary widely and include almost all of today's developing countries.
Some are mired in poverty and violence. Others accumulate considerable productive assets, use them with at least modest efficiency, and allow most of the society to share in some of the resultant output growth. The framework distinguishes between two separate problems of development. The first development problem reflects the task of helping societies increase per capita incomes from $400 to $8,000. This problem requires understanding how limited access orders behave, since most of the development the Bank wishes to promote occurs within the range of limited access orders. The second development problem is the transition from a limited access order to an open access order-from societies with per capita income of say $8,000 to societies with per capita incomes of $35,000. The two development problems are completely different, since one involves changes within the limited access order and the other involves the transformation of that social order into an open access order. . Our approach to the first development problem has two important implications. It suggests an explanation for the persistence of poverty and retarded development that explicitly incorporates the role of endemic violence, rent-creation, and limited access in the structure of developing societies. It sheds light on why those structures hinder development and especially why they are so difficult to change. The framework also allows us to see why institutional changes persist only when they are compatible with the incentives and constraints of those in power. It explains why the larger society is often more concerned with enabling those in power to maintain order than with achieving a more open social system. Taken together, these ideas suggest that development policies often fail because they try to transplant elements of the open access order --such as competition, markets, and democracy --directly into limited access orders. These reforms threaten the rent-creation that holds the society together and in many cases challenge the very logic on which the society is organized. Not surprisingly, the elite and many non-elite resist, sabotage, or subvert such reforms in limited access societies that are not ready for them. LAOs vary widely, as discussed below, and further analysis with this framework may help us understand the appropriateness of various reforms.
The RHH framework has many lessons for new democracies, post-conflict societies, and other low and middle-income countries today. Developing countries today are in a different situation from 200 years ago, and each country that has moved to open access has some unique features of its transition. While the basic logic of the limited access order is the same in today's developing world as it was in Europe of 1800 when the first countries began the transition to open access, the context has changed dramatically. The logic of the limited access order plays out differently in the modern world than it did 200 years ago.
Section II presents the RHH framework, and explains the logic of the two social orders.
Section III discusses why institutions work differently in limited and open access orders and the challenges that this difference presents for development policy. Section IV examines how the changes of the last two centuries in the international political system and technology (production, warfare, communication, and institutional organization) have altered the prospects for development in limited access orders. Section V discusses how the framework suggests new approaches to the development problem and to the question of why standard development advice often fails to achieve development.
II. Limited and Open Access Orders
Most existing political and economic models of development posit a continuous path or process along which countries develop. In contrast, our framework has two distinct types of equilibria, each with a different mechanism to sustain itself. Those countries in the limited access order (LAO) have social, economic, and political systems based on limited entry and rent-creation. Elites in limited access orders use rents to maintain order and to hold the social order together.
ii The political system manipulates the economy to generate rents that bind the interests of economic actors to support the current political system. The limited access order appears to be the means by which all but a handful of societies have secured order and limited violence for the last 10,000 years. We think of the limited access order as a natural state because it appears to be the natural way for societies to solve the problem of violence.
By contrast, a few countries in the past two centuries made the transition to a system based on open access and competition. An open access order (OAO) is defined as a country where access to economic, political, and social organizations, including the freedom to form them, is open to all individuals who qualify as citizens in the society and where citizens comprise most of the population. The ability to form organizations at will is necessary to sustain thriving competition in both politics and economics. In politics, competition arises at several levels, including organized political parties that vie for political control and competition among groups, constituencies, and regions that vie for political influence. In economics, competition arises from organized firms. Competition in both the economic and political systems depends on the ability of people to form organizations and to utilize the state to support these organizations (for example, in contract enforcement).
II.1 The Logic of Limited Access Orders
Almost all theories of the state explicitly or implicitly make two assumptions: first, the state can be modeled as a single actor and, second, the state has a monopoly on violence.
Prominent examples include Olson's (1993) stationary bandit, North (1981, ch 3) and Levi's (1988) revenue maximizing monarch, and the standard theories of rent-seeking (Buchanan, Tollison and Tullock 1980) . iii Normative economics, the principal component of the traditional approach to development, also falls in this category: it assumes a benevolent social planner that is a single actor (with no collective choice problems), has a monopoly on violence and, by virtue of benevolence, does not use violence for destruction or expropriation. These assumptions lead to misunderstandings of the problems of development. We begin in a different place.
In most societies, historical and contemporary, violence potential is spread throughout the population rather than concentrated. No one, including the state, has a monopoly on violence.
Establishing a society that fosters peace, specialization, and exchange requires the creation of incentives for groups to compete peacefully rather than fight. LAOs are the natural response of societies to the threat (and sometimes the actuality) of internal or external violence. An LAO reduces violence by forming a dominant coalition containing all individuals and groups with sufficient access to violence that can, if they act unilaterally, create disorder.
The dominant coalition creates cooperation and order by limiting access to valuable resources -land, labor, and capital -or access and control of valuable activities -such as contract enforcement, property right enforcement, trade, worship, and education -to elite groups.
Restricting support for organizations to elite groups magnifies the rents that elite groups receive.
Sophisticated social organizations require the ability to make agreements within and between organizations that rely on external, third party enforcement. Limiting access to organizational forms and contract enforcement is the key to the limited access order: it creates rents through exclusive privileges and directly enhances the value of the privileges by making elites more productive through their organizations.
Because violence reduces elites rents, the existence of the rents can motivate credible commitments among elites that they will not fight each other. iv Sometimes they fight anyway, but the cost of fighting makes it less likely. Maintaining the rents depends on the stability of the current coalition. The creation and distribution of rents therefore secures elite loyalty to the system, which in turn protects rents, limits violence, and prevents disorder most of the time.
These causal links reflect the LAOs arrangements as a kind of social equilibrium: all the parts interact to sustain the social order. Rent-creation through the assignment of exclusive rights and privileges and the selective suppression of competition is at the heart of the LAO. Rent-creation provides the glue that holds the coalition together, enabling elite groups to make credible commitments to one another to support the regime and to perform their functions. Mature LAOs are more resilient to shocks than fragile or basic LAOs. The durable public institutions of a mature LAO are capable, in normal circumstances, of lasting through changes in the make-up of the dominant coalition. Nonetheless, shocks always have the possibility for breakdowns, and mature LAOs face intermittent crises. The extent to which mature LAOs have more durable state institutions than basic ones is a matter of degree rather than of kind.
In the mature LAO, some actors come to specialize in political or economic activities.
Violence specialists will have more distinct and often separate organizations. The violence organizations, however, cannot be outside of the state structure and control. In contrast, it is difficult to differentiate political from economic actors in fragile and basic LAOs. All of the political and economic networks in these societies included violence specialists in their retinues or alliances. The integration of politics and economics is so complete, and the state relatively undifferentiated, that all actors are at once political and economic. In particular, in basic LAOs, organizations are at once public, political, and economic-the only sophisticated organizations are those of the state.
Although the different types of LAOs can be ordered in a progression from less to most developed, the progression is not a teleology: nothing inherent in any of these types impels them to move from fragile to basic or from basic to mature. States can regress as well as progress, and many states stagnate for decades or centuries. For example, Bolivia, Venezuela, and Russia all seem to be regressing as they nationalize, control, or outlaw once independent organizations.
Similarly, states that fall into violence, such as Rwanda, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, all regress. Germany in the 1920s and 30s regressed from a mature LAO on the doorstep of OAO in 1913 to become more of a basic LAO under the Nazis.
Germany is good example of why fragile, basic, and mature LAOs are not ideal types but general categories. The spectrum of limited access orders do not translate neatly into ideal types.
In a fragile LAO, the problem of endemic violence means that the dominant coalition directs its efforts primarily at sustaining the state itself. In the transition, property rights and rule of law are transformed in two steps. When the tipping point is reached, the dominant coalition finds that its internal arrangements are better served by supporting intra-elite competition, rather than intra-elite cooperation to perpetuate existing mechanisms of rent-creation. That is, it makes sense for the elites to define themselves impersonally as citizens, rather than as kings, dukes, earls, etc. to extend the access to larger segments of society.
A transition then, has two parts, at least in the historical cases that we have examined.
The first part occurs when a mature LAO moves to the doorstep conditions. There is nothing, unfortunately, about being on the doorstep that impels societies into a transition. The doorstep conditions create the possibility for intra-elite impersonal exchange. The second part of the transition occurs when intra-elite relationships are put on the impersonal basis of -citizenship‖:
when each elite possesses his or her rights simply because they meet certain impersonally defined requirements. Further research is needed to see if transitions after 1950 have had or will have similar features.
III. Implications: Why the Behavior of Institutions Depends on the Social Order in which They Are Embedded
The two social orders maintain themselves in very different ways: LAOs through limiting access, rent-creation, and the selective suppression of competition; OAOs through open access and competition. The same institutional forms therefore work differently in the two social orders. This makes the transition more difficult to understand, much less to implement or trigger by deliberate policy interventions, and deserves further discussion.
What is an institution? North (1991) defines an institution as the -rules of the game.‖ Institutions, however, involve more than explicit written rules. They also include informal norms behavior, the mechanisms by which the rules are enforced, and individual beliefs and expectations about how the institution, and other individuals, will behave. Greif (2005) identifies these separate elements that collectively make up institutions. If we use such an inclusive definition of institutions, then it is clear that every institution is unique, and it makes no sense at all to compare institutions in different societies or in different social orders.
Instead, we use the term -institutional form‖ to refer to explicit and formal institutional arrangements, like a written constitution, and -mechanisms‖ to represent the formal or informal way the institutional forms are implemented and sustained. An institutional form might specify that leaders are to be selected by majority-rule elections, and the mechanisms are the process by which the election is implemented. xiii Institutional forms and mechanisms explicitly do not include beliefs, cultures, or whether the institution is embedded in a limited or open access order.
Along with loans or grants of funds, much of the assistance the World Bank offers to its clients come as recommendations and incentives to adopt specific institutional forms and mechanisms.
Understanding why reform of institutional forms often fails to produce transformations in developing countries requires recognizing that the same institutional forms work differently in limited and open access orders, even if the recipient country has the political will to implement the reform.
An important difference between the two social orders is the transformation from personal exchange to impersonal exchange in both economic and political systems. Open access orders have the ability to create and sustain impersonal exchange, in politics, economics, and in government administration: open access orders can issue driver's licenses and similar public goods to people based on relatively objective administrative criteria. In the LAO's personal exchange systems, the logic of the LAO creates incentives such that the delivery of government services always depends on whom the recipient is connected to. LAO bureaucracies and judiciaries find it difficult, if not impossible, to deliver services according to impersonal criteria. This is not necessarily because the bureaucrats or judges are personally corrupt, but because the system of incentives created by the social order offers them little or no opportunity to change.
The administration of welfare programs, business licenses, and judicial services all require personal exchange -and often bribes -in limited access orders. Ration cards in India, for example, often never reach the poor; instead they are sold informally to people who can afford them, generating income for those who distribute these cards. 
IV. Why Forces Operating in the Modern World May Not Produce Transitions in Limited Access Orders
The world of 2007 differs substantially from that of 1800, in large part because open societies have developed, grown, and for much of the last two centuries controlled large parts of the planet. Many historians, economists and political scientists -including Lenin and Wallenstein -have discussed the effects that economically developed countries on the less developed. The value added in our approach is that it allows us to examine the effects of the developed on the developing world in light of the logic of the limited access order. We focus on four dimensions of these effects that have changed fundamentally in the past two centuries -the availability of institutional forms in open access orders, the world political order, technology, and multinational firms.
The development community, both practical and academic, has at one time or another had hope that these new factors in the modern world will make it easier for limited access orders to make the transition. As we discuss in this section, it ain't necessarily so.
IV.1 Institutional Forms
Extensive experimentation with political and economic institutional technology has 
IV.2 The World Political Order
The world political order has changed fundamentally since 1600; including in the way that governments define themselves, their population, and their territory. The change started in Europe. In 1600 everyone with any status or property had a designated place in a hierarchy of interpersonal oaths and obligations made in return for specific privileges, often including some degree of land proprietorship. The state did not have a territory as such; rather for each king, one could in principle point to an array of territory to which he had direct claim or to which those with allegiance to him had claim (generally in return for that allegiance). Moreover, the boundaries of the state in this and earlier ages were not well-defined.
Between 1600 and the late nineteenth century, the institutions of the national state emerged, and almost all of the land and population of Western Europe came to be identified as the territory and citizens, respectively, of these national states. This process occurred simultaneously, in time and causation, with the development of the perpetually-lived state, property rights and perpetually lived organizations outside of the state. Initially these rights and organizations were only for the elite, but over time access to them became more widely available.
This is the transition process described in RHH and summarized above.
Outside of Europe, similar concepts emerged in the half century after 1776 in the Western
Hemisphere former colonies of Europe. xiv Africa and Asia, on the other hand either became colonies of Europe or in some cases continued as empires or kingdoms (Chinese, Ottoman, Ethiopian, Siamese, Russian) with their distinctive non-European features.
In the wake of the two world wars of the early twentieth century and subsequent decolonization, national states were set up for much of East and Central Europe, the Caribbean, the former Ottoman empire, Africa, and Asia. People in these places, especially the leaders who had received higher education in Europe, wanted to follow the example of European national states. In Western Europe the national states of 1900 had developed the institutional strength to survive many internal and external challenges. Those without strength did not survive, and their populations and peoples were taken over by other states (Tilly 1990) . The upside of the modern world order has been stability of external borders, so that countries had the opportunity in the second half of the twentieth century to focus on building up their domestic institutions. Not all of them used that opportunity.
We have developed the theory of limited and open access orders as a way to understand the variation among countries or societies. We take these countries as our given units of observations. Some commentators have noted, however, that the whole world order can be seen as a limited access order that assigns each area and population of the world to a different government, which is then allowed to manage or exploit its people and resources without outside
interference. An important motivation for this international framework was to reduce the frequency and destructiveness of war. The Peace Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 was a deliberate attempt to reduce war among the major powers of Europe at the end of the 30-Years War, which had climaxed a long century of conflict about which branch of Christianity would dominate. The treaty held that the ruler of each principality could decide the religion of his people, and outsiders would not interfere. Similarly, to reduce conflict in their expansion to overseas empires, Portugal and Spain agreed around 1500 to divide their colonial rights in the Americas. Three centuries later, the major powers of Europe met in Berlin in 1882 to agree on a division of colonization rights in Africa. The cold war division of 1945-90 can also be seen in part as an arrangement to avoid nuclear conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States (and its nuclear armed allies in Western Europe) by dividing the world Each power recognized in practice the authority of the other to determine the economic organization and thus the allocation of rents in its sphere of influence. In all of these instances, at least some of the participants were limited access orders, so the governments had a direct stake in the allocation of rents.
In the European Union, we see a new phenomenon, where the criteria for membership essentially are the acceptance of open access rule for the economy and polity. The long-term effects of EU accession remain to be seen, but seem to herald an expansion of the OAO world.
VI.3 Technology
Compared with 200 or 400 years ago, technology is the most eye-catching difference in the world today, both in the level and in the rapidity of change. Technology transfer has the promise of letting more backward economies catch-up quickly. Unfortunately, internationally available technology is not a panacea and in some cases may retard institutional development. This point does not deny the productivity benefits to the elite in a country that has its own technology development; rather it recognizes that there is a cost to having the open access necessary for local technological progress -a cost not only in money but also (from the point of view of an LAO elite) in loosening the control on access to organizational forms. If elites can get most of the technology they want without allowing a flowering of potentially competing organizations, then they are less likely to allow such institutional change that threatens the stability of their situation.
Some scholars treat development as identical with productivity growth (Landes 1999; 1969; Mokyr 1990.) , while others like Fogel and North see a distinction. The present framework allows us to examine the distinction more precisely. Development can be defined as movement along the spectrum of LAOs and the transition from an LAO to an OAO. This movement has generally led to increased productivity and incomes. Increases in income in and of themselves, however, rarely help states move along the spectrum of LAOs, much less to make the transition to an OAO. Growth due to technological change, therefore, does not necessarily produce either of these forms of development; so technological improvements do not necessarily contribute to development. So-called developing countries can adopt improved production technology (causing TFP growth) and to some extent even develop new technology themselves without becoming OAOs, achieving the doorstep conditions, or even becoming a mature LAO in the sense of supporting a wide array of organizations outside of the state.
Communications technology is particularly noteworthy, not only because it facilitates production and is itself an item of consumption, but because it is essential to forming and sustaining organizations. Improvement in communications technology has multiple and contradictory effects on the two development problems and on the freedom of ordinary people. Participation in the enclave of the global economy, with access to international capital and secure property rights, gives third world elites opportunities to prosper without having to alter their domestic LAO institutions that produce security and that sustain their rents. By allowing additional streams of rents without threatening the domestic order, enclaves allow elites greater rents and thus greater incentives to maintain the current system. Better local institutions (outside the enclave) are not created or remain dysfunctional because the elites with international connections do not need the local institutions and because the lack of local institutions creates a barrier to entry that benefits incumbent elites.
V. Conclusions: Why Existing Approaches to Development Often Fail and An Alternative Approach
In the last fifty years, donor organizations have provided developing countries (and failed states) with policy and technical advice. In some places this has contributed to improvements both in material outcomes and in the quality of institutions -more mature LAOs and even movement toward OAOs in a few cases. In many places, however, the advice (and accompanying financing) has failed to promote systematic development or significant reductions in poverty. Why does such advice fail?
Existing approaches to development rely heavily on economics. They focus on market-oriented reform, such as -getting prices right,‖ and market-supporting institutions, such as property rights, rule of law, and democratic governance. According to this standard view, the extensive use of market controls and state intervention in LAOs reflects the negative influence of special interest groups and corrupt governments.
The problem with the standard approach to development is that the typical recommendations aim to introduce unmodified elements of open access orders into developing societies. These elements -property rights, the market, institutions of the rule of law, and democracy -can fail when inserted into limited access orders without taking account of the problem of the endemic distribution of the potential for violence. Some of them can work in LAOs, indeed they may help the movement toward a more mature LAO and the achievement of the doorstep conditions, but our model predicts that they will yield the expected benefits only if consistent with the logic of limited access in the actual country circumstance.
The foundation of the limited access order is its solution to the problem of violence.
Reforms fail and lead to regression if they do not include arrangements to sustain this solution.
The LAO gains stability when a dominant coalition emerges that provides powerful individuals and groups with incentives to refrain from violence. By limiting access, the LAO creates rents that help maintain peace. Limiting access and rent-creation is more than just service to interest groups; it is a solution to the problem of violence. More competition, opening access, or freer markets can weaken the rent-creation system that holds the LAO together. These reforms therefore threaten the basis of order and hold the risk of violence. Similarly, attempts to remove corruption, create rule of law, and institute democracy with competitive parties can also destabilize an LAO and generate broad resistance. Groups who benefit directly from market distortions -firms that receive monopoly profits or groups that receive services at subsidized prices -will resist the reforms. Paradoxically, many who are exploited by these policies will hesitate to push for reform because they see disorder and violence as worse than being exploited economically.
Perhaps even more problematic is the possibility that the dominant coalition in a LAO can adopt the institutional forms proposed by an international donor without fundamentally changing the way the receiving society operates. Since institutional forms and mechanisms operated differently in different societies, recipient countries may be able to adopt the recommended institutional forms and co-opt those forms to sustain or strengthen their LAOs. In retrospect, donors evaluate these programs and complain that the reforms were mere window dressing or that the country lacked -political will.‖ We need to appreciate more deeply the logic and power of the LAO by which elites have incentives to subvert these reforms or, as they would see it, to adapt the institutional forms to local conditions.
Our approach remains in its beginnings and offers no magic solutions to problems of development. Nonetheless, it provides some insights suggesting a new approach to development policies. Developing countries face two separate development problems, not one, and the policies necessary to foster development are different for each problem. The first development problem is the movement along the spectrum of LAOs -fragile, basic, mature -and the creation of the doorstep conditions. Historically, only the most sophisticated and, as it turns out, rich Our approach does address the problem of poverty in that mature LAOs are significantly richer than fragile LAOs. Moving developing countries along the progression of types of LAOs typically expands the elite and at least some LAOs have thus made significant progress in reducing poverty (Dollar 2005) . Moving states along the LAO progression benefit for the poor as these states become more resilient to shocks and therefore suffer fewer debilitating crises that hurt everyone in the society.
These important issues deserve further investigation. Modern economics provides a good understanding of thriving markets and the competitive mechanisms that create them. Legal scholarship provides a good understanding of the legal systems required to sustain property rights, enforce contracts, and regulate certain types of externalities (as in torts). Missing is the equivalent knowledge in political science that affords an understanding of the political and constitutional institutions that can sustain these. Consider the mature LAO's sustaining of private organizations. We know something about the legal mechanisms necessary for sustaining these organizations, including contract enforcement between the organization and its members and among organizations. Yet we know too little about the mechanisms and institutions by which a mature LAO sustains these institutions and motivates members of the dominant coalition to respect these services. It is one thing to create courts and justices and another to ensure they can sustain the independence necessary to produce the impartial delivery of justice. Having given some reasons why existing development policy is inadequate, we can only point in the direction of what should replace it.
i.The authors are affiliated, respectively, with Washington University (St. Louis), the University of Maryland (College Park), the World Bank, and Stanford University. The opinions in this paper are those of the authors and do not reflect official positions of the World Bank or the universities with which the authors are affiliated.
ii.The terms -order‖ and -social order‖ have different meanings. The former means peace and security --the opposite of disorder; the latter means the organization of society and its component economic, political, and social systems. So as not to confuse the two meanings, we will always use the adjective -social‖ to indicate the latter, and -order‖ alone to indicate the former.
iii.Most other approaches to the state are also Weberian, e.g., Barzel (2000) , Levi (1988) , and Tilly (1993) ; see also Brennan and Buchanan's (1980) leviathan model. More recent political economy models of policymaking also make the Weberian assumptions, including Bueno de Mesquita et. al. (2003) and Grossman and Helpman (2001) .
iv Klein and Leffler (1981) make a similar argument in the context of rents and commitment to assure contractual performance.
v.Notice that this view of rent-creation differs from the more well-known approach to rent-seeking (e.g., Buchanan, Tollison and Tullock 1980) . That approach is also Weberian: it assumes away the problem of violence and takes the state as given.
vi.The independence of private organizations is a continuous variable, not a zero/one condition.
vii.Soviet Russia, however, is a clear example where a basic LAO was able to obtain consolidated political control of violence, but could not sustain private elite organizations outside the framework of the state.
viii As discussed later, multinational corporations are important exceptions and generally operate in enclaves when they come to basic or fragile LAOs.
ix The fragile-basic-mature spectrum is only one possible way to differentiate LAOs. For instance Mushtaq Khan and coauthors have made insightful distinctions about forms of rentcreation-to explain they produce incentives that promote or inhibit productivity growth in the economy (Khan and Komo 2000; Khan 2007) x.The 5 percent example ignores the problem that in most limited access orders, elites are also differentiated from one another. Limited access orders do not contain a homogenous class of elites, but a group of elites who possess personal as well as general privileges. The one-third figure is also only suggestive. First, a third of what? The adult males? We do not propose that a quantitative figure has any predictive or explanatory power.
xi Open access orders tend to rely on broad taxes on economic activity, such as the income tax or a value added tax. Limited access orders rely less on these broad taxes, often raising considerable revenue from various rent-creation activities, state owned enterprises, and resources. xii.A perpetually lived organization is an organization whose legal existence is independent of the identity of any specific individual members. In modern societies, business corporations enjoy perpetual live, business partnerships do not.
xiii.For example, in the United States there are detailed formal rules specifying how the President is to be elected, but there is no provision in the constitution for political parties, the actual mechanism by which potential candidates are selected.
xiv. Canada, Australia, and New Zealand became independent with these institutions a century later.
xv.Elites in some third world countries also face fewer positive incentives to develop domestic institutions for efficient finance, exchange and property rights, which is due to factors discussed later.
xvi.The next section discusses the general topic of how OAO-based firms behave when operating in LAOs.
